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Abstract. This is an analysis of strategic voting under qualied majority voting. Existing
formal analyses of the plurality rule predict complete coordination of strategic voting: a strict
interpretation of Duverger's Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the pop-
ular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public
and private signals of popular support. When private signals are the main source of infor-
mation, the uniquely stable equilibrium entails only limited strategic voting and hence partial
coordination. This is due to the surprising presence of negative feedback | strategic voting
is a self-attenuating phenomenon. The theory leads to the conclusion that multi-candidate
support in a plurality electoral system is perfectly consistent with rational voting behaviour.
Incomplete. See Nueld College DP Series for Completed Version.
1. Rethinking Strategic Voting
Duverger (1954) introduced his Law to political economy by noting that \the simple-majority
single-ballot system favors the two-party system". His aim was to evaluate the eect of vot-
ing systems on the structure and number of political parties. Duverger's writing envisaged
an ongoing process involving both voters and political parties with bipartism as an eventual
conclusion. More recent authors have oered a stricter version of Duverger's Law. The models
of Cox (1994), Palfrey (1989) and Myerson and Weber (1993) predict strict bipartism as the
outcome of any plurality rule election. Palfrey's (1989) \mathematical proof" claims that:
\::: with instrumentally rational voters and fullled expectations, multicandi-
date contests under the plurality rule should result in only two candidates getting
any votes."
These authors consider a population of agents each casting a single vote, where the candidate
with the largest number of votes wins. They claim that the uniquely stable equilibrium outcome
This paper is based on part III of Myatt (1999). Stephen D. Fisher inspired this work with his extensive
empirical research on tactical voting, and with many hours of conversation on the topic. Grateful thanks are
also due to David Firth, Geo Evans, Iain McLean, Chris Wallace and seminar participants at Oxford, UCL,
LSE and Edinburgh for helpful comments. Robin Mason is entirely responsible for any remaining errors, due to
his nagging request to get the paper nished prior to a Southampton seminar. Cheers Robin.
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Figure 1. British General Election 1997. This simplex plot shows the relative
vote shares for the three main British political parties | Conservative, Labour
and Liberal Democrat. The plot restricts to English constituencies, hence avoid-
ing the impact of the increased number of competing political parties in Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland.
involves positive support for only two candidates. This outcome is the result of strategic voting
| agents voting for other than their preferred candidates. Indeed, the prediction is that agents
fully coordinate in their strategic behaviour.
Is the bipartite prediction borne out by the data? Unsurprisingly, it is not. The 1997 British
General Election provides an illustration. Throughout the constituencies of England, three
major parties compete. Figure 1 plots the relative vote shares for these three parties in 527
English parliamentary constituencies.1 It appears that complete bipartite outcomes are absent.
This appeal to the data would suggest a lack of rationality on voters | the degree of strategic
voting is rather less than a rationality-based theory predicts. Or is it?
This new theory argues that partial coordination in a strategic voting setting is perfectly con-
sistent with fully rational behaviour on the part of individual agents. The argument stems
from the observation that the assumed independence of preferences drives existing models. In
response, a new model is developed in which agents are uncertain of constituency-wide prefer-
ences. The public and private information sources upon which individuals condition their voting
decisions are carefully specied. When private information dominates, the analysis shows that
1Two English constituencies are omitted. West Bromwich West is the Speaker's seat, and is uncontested by
major parties. The Labour and Liberal Democrat parties withdrew from Tatton in favour of an independent
candidate. Thanks are due to Steve Fisher for providing the data.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 3
strategic voting is self-attenuating rather than self-reinforcing. Negative feedback leads away
from fully coordinated strategies, and towards multi-candidate support as a stable equilibrium.
The argument is built upon the analysis of a qualied majority voting game. This game is
designed to highlight strategic vote switches between two candidates. Each member of a large
electorate must cast a vote for one of two options. Both of these options are preferred by all
agents to the status quo. Implementation of an option requires a qualied majority of the
electorate to vote in favour: For 1 >  > 1
2, a fraction  of the electorate must vote in favour
of an option in order to avoid the status quo. An immediate strategic incentive is present. An
agent, preferring option 2, may instead decide to vote for option 1 in the belief that her vote is
more likely to inuence the election, and hence avoid the disliked default outcome.
What determines the voting decision of a rational agent in this scenario? A single agent can
only inuence the outcome when she has a casting vote. This pivotal outcome occurs when
the vote total for one of the options is just equal to that required for a qualied majority. An
extra vote will then implement that option rather than the status quo. The agent balances the
relative probability of the two possible pivotal outcomes against her relative preference for the
two options. It is the pivotal likelihood ratio that is the key determinant of an agent's voting
decision. This key insight is clear from earlier decision-theoretic work by Homan (1982) and
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972), and is explored in a game-theoretic context by Palfrey (1989),
Myerson and Weber (1993) and Cox (1994).2 Indeed, this likelihood ratio provides the strategic
incentive for a rational voter to abandon her preferred option.
Unfortunately, these earlier models all share a common feature. The preferences of individual
agents are assumed to be drawn independently from a commonly known distribution. Why
is this feature so critical to their results? Suppose that all remaining agents commit to vot-
ing straightforwardly | they vote for their preferred option. As the constituency size grows
large, the absolute probability of a pivotal outcome falls to zero. More importantly, however,
the relative probability | the pivotal likelihood ratio | diverges as the constituency grows
large. This yields an unboundedly large strategic incentive for a rational voter. Such a voter
will almost always choose to vote for the option with greater constituency-wide support. Of
course, adopting a game-theoretic perspective, this eect is reinforced, and a fully-coordinated
equilibrium in which all agents vote for a single option is realised.
The independence of preferences that is so key to these earlier models is an unattractive feature.
Whereas the preferences of an individual are unknown to an observer, the average constituency
wide preference is certain. As the constituency grows large, the idiosyncratic preferences of
individual agents are averaged out | a consequence of the Law of Large Numbers. An observer
can then give a precise prediction of the electoral outcome, even for truthful voting. The
theory presented here abandons this feature. To achieve this, an individual agent's relative
2For an authoritative survey of this literature see Cox (1997).SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 4
payo for the two options is decomposed into common and idiosyncratic eects. The common
eect is shared by all agents, whereas the idiosyncratic component is distributed independently
throughout the electorate. Importantly | and in contrast to the Cox-Palfrey framework |
the common eect is unknown to members of the electorate. As the constituency grows large,
the idiosyncratic eects are averaged out, but uncertainty over the common eect remains. It
follows that the pivotal likelihood ratio | and hence the strategic incentive | remains nite.
Importantly, this limiting pivotal likelihood ratio is driven entirely by uncertainty over the
common eect.
With a nite pivotal likelihood ratio, strategic voting is incomplete and there is only partial
coordination. Returning to a game theoretic perspective, however, the possibility of a fully
coordinated equilibrium outcome remains. The standard logic of self-reinforcing strategic voting
is as follows. The loss of support for the less favoured option from strategic switching enhances
the strategic incentive to switch to the more favoured option. Strategic switching increases once
more, yielding a further increase in the strategic incentive. This is a tale of positive feedback,
yielding the \bandwagon eect" of Simon (1954).
This logic is awed. In fact, strategic voting may exhibit negative feedback | a self-attenuating
phenomenon. What argument supports this claim? First, note that the positive-feedback logic
makes the implicit assumption that the most-favoured option is commonly known. If voting
decisions are based on the privately observed information sources, then this assumption fails.
It is clear that a voter's information sources are important.
To investigate this issue, the information sources upon which votes base their decisions are
modelled. Agents commonly observe a public signal of the common utility component | this
formalises the idea of a publicly observed opinion poll. Each individual agent also observes a
private signal. This feature reects private interaction with other members of the constituency.
Voting decisions are then contingent on the realisation of this private signal, as well as payos
and the public signal. Perhaps surprisingly, if all other agents increase their response to their
private signal, then the best response for a rational individual is to reduce her response in turn.
Why is this? Consider a constituency in which all agents vote straightforwardly. A relatively
large constituency-wide lead for option 1 is required to achieve the qualied majority, and
similarly for option 2. When computing the pivotal likelihood ratio, a rational agent compares
two events that are relatively far apart. Switch now to a constituency in which voters respond
strongly to their private signals. A much smaller lead for option 1 is sucient to achieve the
qualied majority. A small lead yields private signals in favour of option 1. These translate into
strategic votes away from option 2, and hence to the required qualied majority. Similarly, only
a small lead for option 2 is sucient to do the same. These two pivotal events are now much
closer, yielding a likelihood ratio that is closer to one. A rational vote faces a lower strategic
incentive.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 5
Of course, this argument relies on the use of private signals. If voting decisions are based on
public signals, strategic voting continues to be self-reinforcing. Including both public and private
signals, the analysis nds a unique partially coordinated equilibrium. This is uniquely stable
when private signals are suciently precise relative to public signals. Hence, in constituencies
where private information sources are likely to be more important, rational voting leads to a
partially coordinated voting equilibrium.
Moving to a uniquely dened partially coordinated equilibrium allows a new range of compar-
ative statics. Restricting to pure private information sources, the precision of private signals
increases the incentive for tactical voting, although at a slower rate than in a decision-theoretic
model. Tactical voting is also increasing in the severity of the qualied majority hurdle, as well
as the asymmetry between the support of the two options.
The argument is formalised in the following sections. Section 2 describes the qualied majority
voting game, preferences and signals. The importance of constituency uncertainty is highlighted
in the analysis of Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate the self-attenuating nature of strategic
voting and investigate the existence and stability of equilibria. Section 8 concludes.
2. Model
The argument is formalised with reference to a simple qualied majority voting game.
2.1. Voting Rules. There are n+1 agents, indexed by i 2 f0;1;::: ;ng. A collective decision
is taken via qualied majority voting. There are three possible actions j 2 f0;1;2g, where
j = 0 represents the status quo. Each agent casts a single vote for either of the two options
j 2 f1;2g.3 Denoting the vote totals for each of these options by x1 and x2 respectively, it





0 maxfx1;x2g  nn
1 x1 > nn







<  < 1
The restriction  > 1=2 ensures that rst, it is impossible for both options 1 and 2 to meet
the winning criterion of xj > nn, and second, the winning option must have a strict major-
ity of the n + 1 strong electorate in order to win. The parameter  gives a measure of the
degree of coordination required to implement one of the actions j 2 f1;2g. For  # 1
2, only
a simple majority is required. For  " 1, complete coordination of all agents is needed for an
implementation.
3The model extends easily to deal with the possibility of abstentions, corresponding to the option j = 0, since
all agents strictly prefer both of the actions j 2 f1;2g to the status quo.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 6
2.2. Preferences. Payos are contingent only on the implemented action. The payo uij is
received by agent i when action j is implemented. All agents strictly prefer both actions j 2
f1;2g to the status quo. This yields the payo normalisation ui0 = 0 and hence minfui1;ui2g >
0. The relative preference for the two options varies throughout the population of agents.
Section 3 demonstrates that the ratio [ui1=ui2] is sucient to determine an agent's decision.






=  + i
where  is a common component to all agents. The idiosyncratic component i is distributed
independently across agents, with distribution i  N(0;2).
An easy interpretation is that  represents population-wide factors aecting all agents. By con-
trast, i represents the idiosyncratic preference of agent i. More generally,  is the expectation
of log[ui1=ui2] conditional on all population information, generating the residual component i.
The parametric specication of i is not critical to the argument. Imposing a normal distribu-
tion allows an easy microfoundation for the signal specications described below. Notice that
the variance term 2 provides a measure of idiosyncrasy throughout the population.
An individual agent does not observe the decomposition of her preferences. In particular, the
common utility component  is unknown. Beliefs about this component are generated following
the receipt of informative signals, to which the model specication now turns.
2.3. Signals. Agents begin with a common and diuse prior over , with no knowledge of the
common utility component. Information on  is then gleaned from two sources: public and
private signals. The public signal models the publication of opinion polls and similar surveys.
Commonly observed by all, it is equal to the true value of the common component, plus noise.




Following observation of this signal, and prior to the receipt of any private information, voters
update to a common public posterior belief of   N(;2).4 Although not a formal feature
of the model, a microfoundation underpins Assumption 2. Suppose that the preferences of m


















4More formally, endow all agents with a common prior of   N(0;
2
0), and Bayesian update following the
observation of . Allowing 
2
0 ! 1 yields the public posterior   N(;
2).SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 7
It is clear that a public signal with variance 2 = 2=m is equivalent to the public observation
of m individuals. Notice that the derivation of Equation (1) employs the distributional spec-
ication of the idiosyncratic component. For large m, however, the Central Limit Theorem
suggests the normal as an appropriate specication for the distribution of .
Viewed as an opinion poll, Assumption 2 provides a natural framework. In particular, the
widespread publication of opinion polls is common during an election. For large m, this leads
to precise public information. In an election scenario, however, publicly observed polls tend to
occur at the national level. Voting, however, will typically take place at a regional level. At the
regional level, public opinion polls are rather less common.5 Any common regional component
to preferences will remain uncertain. Agents do, however, have other sources of information
available to them. In particular, a signal of constituency-wide candidate support may be ob-
tained from the people with whom an individual interacts. The important characteristic of such
information is that it leads to private signals.
Assumption 3. Each agent i observes a private signal i  N(;2). Conditional on , this
is independent across agents but may be correlated with the idiosyncratic component i.
Once again, a microfoundation is available. The signal i corresponds to the private observation
of m randomly chosen individuals, with 2 = 2=m. In particular, an agent's own payos are
a signal of . Hence, with m = 1, it follows that 2 = 2. More generally, with this micro-
foundation, the variance of private signals is bounded above, with 2  2. The inclusion of an
agent's own preferences in the signal results in correlation between the signal and idiosyncratic
utility component i. For instance, in a sample of size m > 1:













This feature is incorporated into the analysis, and extends easily to further correlation between
the preferences of voter i and sampled individuals. Dening the correlation coecient between





Following the observation of i, a voter updates to obtain a private posterior belief.








Proof: Apply the standard Bayesian updating procedure | see DeGroot (1970).
5Once again, the 1997 British General Election provides an example. Evans, Curtice and Norris (1998) note
that 47 nationwide opinion polls were conducted during the election campaign. By contrast, only 29 polls were
conducted in 26 dierent constituencies at a constituency level, out of a total of 659 constituencies.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 8
The specication of private signals implicitly assumes that sampled individuals reveal their pref-
erences truthfully. Furthermore, since the unconditional probability of inuencing the election
outcome is vanishingly small, it seems unlikely that individuals would nd a costly information
acquisition exercise to be worthwhile. The argument presented here accepts this latter critique.
If a voter nds it too costly to conduct a private opinion poll, then the strategic manipulation
of voting intentions by sampled individuals is no longer of relevance. The question of the pri-
vate information source remains. It is envisioned that his information is accumulated over an
extended period of time prior to an election, in the course of daily activity. It seems unlikely
that a sampled individual would nd response manipulation worthwhile over such a time frame.
How does the specication of this model dier from the Cox-Palfrey framework? Consider a
symmetric strategy prole. With such a prole, the voting decision of an agent is contingent
solely on the realised signals and payos. Conditional on  and , the private signals and payos
are identically and independently distributed across voters. It follows that voting decisions
inherit these properties. This indeed would yield the Cox-Palfrey model. Note, however, that 
is unknown to any particular agent. From the agent's point of view, the voting decisions of the
remaining electorate are not independent. This crucial dierence is central to the argument.
3. Voting Behaviour
Consider the behaviour of agent i = 0. She may only inuence the outcome of the election if
she is pivotal. A pivotal situation arises if, absent her vote, there is an exact tie. Among the
remaining n agents i  1, write x for the total number of votes cast for option 1. There are two
possible pivotal scenarios. If x = nn, then an additional vote will implement option 1 rather
than the status quo. Similarly, if n   x = nn , x = (1   n)n, then a single vote will tip the
balance to option 2. Agent i = 0 has a casting vote. Conditioning on any information available
to agent i = 0, consider the behaviour of the remaining agents. Write:
q1 = Pr[x = nn] and q2 = Pr[n   x = nn]
Hence q1 and q2 are the pivotal probabilities for options 1 and 2, in which one more vote is
required to implement each of these options. Voting for option 1 will turn the status quo
into the implementation of action 1 with probability q1, an expected payo of q1u1, relative
to abstention. Similarly, A vote for option 2 has expected payo q2u2. Although the formal
specication of the model rules out abstention, it is clear that some vote is optimal whenever
minfq1;q2g > 0. This argument leads to the following simple lemma.





1 q1u1 > q2u2
2 q2u2 > q1u1
1 or 2 q1u1 = q2u2SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 9
where qj are the perceived pivotal probabilities.
Importantly, notice that when option 1 is strongly supported, so that x > nn, an agent's vote
has no eect. Similarly when option 2 is strongly supported. It follows that a rational voter
is uninterested in such events, and concerned only with the probability of tied outcomes. This
notion, familiar from earlier work by Homan (1982) and Myerson and Weber (1993) inter alia,
will prove useful in developing intuition for the results that follow.
Before proceeding with the analysis, focus on the case where pivotal outcomes for both options
are possible, so that minfq1;q2g > 0. In this case, assume without loss of generality that an
indierent agent casts her vote for option 1.
Denition 1. Dene the pivotal log likelihood ratio as  = log[q1=q2].
Employing this denition, the optimal voting rule becomes:





+   0
It is clear that the key statistic of interest to a rational voter is , the pivotal log likelihood
ratio. This is evaluated conditional on the appropriate strategy prole adopted by the remaining
population. Indeed, a voting strategy for a rational agent may be conveniently characterised
by the pivotal log likelihood ratio. This is formalised with the following denition.
Denition 2. A belief rule i maps the signals of player i to the extended real line.
Using this denition, a rational agent supports candidate 1 whenever log[ui1=ui2] + i  0.
A belief rule of i  +1 corresponds to always voting for option 1, and symmetrically for
i   1. The analysis seeks symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of the qualied majority vot-
ing game, and hence the restriction will be to symmetric belief rules. Furthermore, rationality
requires that an agent's beliefs (represented by i) depend on her payos insofar as her payos
yield relevant information. Given the microfoundation for private signals, all information pro-
vided by payos is reected in i. Indeed,  and  combine to yield a sucient statistic for .
It follows that a restriction to beliefs rules that are contingent on i and  alone is without loss
of generality.
Assumption 4. Restrict to symmetric belief rules, so that i depends only on the signals, and
not on the identity of player i. Dependence on  will be suppressed, yielding i = (i).
Particular classes of belief rules will be of relevance. These are as follows.
Denition 3. A degenerate belief rule satises   1. A monotonic belief rule (i) is
strictly increasing, nite valued and dierentiable in i for all . An ane belief rule saties
(i) = a + bi for some a and b, where these parameters may depend on .SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 10
4. Pivotal Properties
4.1. No Constituency Uncertainty. Suppose that the common eect  is known. This is
equivalent to the observation of a perfect public signal, where 2 = 0. Assumption 4 restricted
to symmetric belief rules, and hence voting decisions are contingent solely on realised payos
and signals. It follows that, conditional on , these voting decisions are independent. Write p








+ i  0j

It follows that the vote total x for option 1 among the n agents i  1 follows a binomial distri-
bution with parameters p and n. The evaluation of the pivotal probabilities is straightforward:





pnn(1   p)(1 n)n ! 0 as n ! 1
Hence, for large constituencies, the absolute probability of a pivotal outcome falls to zero. But,
as Section 3 argues, it is the relative likelihood of pivotal outcomes that drives the behaviour of








+1 p > 1=2
 1 p < 1=2
It follows that for an unboundedly large electorate n, the tactical incentive 0 for agent i = 0
grows without bound. For p > 1=2, this agent will almost always choose to vote for option
1. Extending this response to the whole population, there is complete coordination, with all
agents strategically abandoning option 2. Notice that the pivotal log likelihood ratio is entirely
driven by idiosyncratic uncertainty. With independent preferences and signals, the consequent
unbounded likelihood ratio drives strategic voting.
4.2. Uncertain Common Eect. But what if the common eect  is uncertain? Conditional
on , voting decisions continue to be drawn from a binomial distribution. But since p depends
on , and  is unknown, it follows that p is unknown. Consider, from the perspective of the
focal agent, uncertainty over p and represent this by the density f(p). Impose the following
assumption on this density.
Assumption 5. The density f(p) is continuous and strictly positive on (0;1).
Assumption 5 will be satised by the monotonic belief rules that are the focus of Section 5.





0 [pn(1   p)1 n]nf(p)dp
R 1
0 [p1 n(1   p)n]nf(p)dp
(2)SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 11
Now, as n ! 1, both the numerator and denominator of this expression vanish. The ratio,
however, does not diverge and indeed converges to an attractive expression. This is revealed in
the following key proposition.








Sketch Proof: Examining Equation (2), notice that the integrand in the numerator vanishes
to zero due to the leading term [p(1   p)1 ]n. As n grows, this expression becomes peaked
around its maximum, which occurs at p = . Hence only density at this point contributes
any weight. The denominator peaks at p = 1   . At these points the leading terms of the
integrands in the numerator and denominator coincide (after a simple change of variable) and
hence the limiting likelihood ratio is the desired expression. See Appendix for a full proof.
What is the interpretation of this proposition? For large constituencies, the relative likelihood
of ties involving options 1 and 2 is the relative likelihood that their respective constituency-wide
support levels (represented by p) coincide with the critical value . Importantly, then, it is only
uncertainty over p (generated by uncertainty over the common eect ) that matters. Why is
this? As the consituency grows large, the individual idiosyncratic eects i are averaged out.
The common eect, however, cannot be averaged out and hence becomes the key determinant.
Notice that in earlier models only idiosyncratic uncertainty was present. But in the presence
of constituency uncertainty, its eect disappears. This suggests that the results from the Cox-
Palfrey may be somewhat misleading in guiding our analysis of voting problems.
The second feature of the proposition is this: the limiting pivotal likelihood ratio is nite.
This yields a nite strategic incentive. It follows that, if all other voters act straightforwardly,
the tactical voting of the focal agent will not be complete. This leaves upon the possibility
that tactical voting may be self-reinforcing, leading to an equilibrium outcome that involves
full coordination. Addressing this issue requires a game-theoretic perspective, to which the
analysis now turns.
5. Best Response and Negative Feedback
5.1. Ane Belief Rules under Best Response. How does a rational voter incorporate
her private signal? The ane belief rules of Denition 3 are attractive. In particular, notice
that straightforward (truthful) voting corresponds to an ane belief rule with a = b = 0.
Furthermore, with an extension to the real line, the degenerate belief rules (and hence fully
coordinated strategy proles) of   1 are obtained by setting a = 1 and b = 0. All well
and good, but why should a rational agent use them? Attention is justied by the following.
Lemma 3. Suppose that in an unboundedly large electorate, all agents i  1 employ a mono-
tonic belief rule (i). A unique best response for agent i = 0 is to use an ane belief rule.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 12
Proof. When belief rules are monotonic, there are two unique values of  that result in a pivotal
outcome. Posterior private beliefs over  are normal, and the log likelihood ratio of the normal
is ane in its mean. For a formal proof, see Appendix.
A simple corollary is that the class of ane belief rules is closed under best response. Further-
more, any search for partially coordinated equilibria using monotonic belief rules may restrict
to the ane class without loss of generality. The specic nature of best responses within the
ane class is established in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. The class of ane belief rules is closed under best response. If all adopt a belief
rule (i) = a + bi, then a best response is to adopt an ane belief rule ^ (i) = ^ a +^ bi where:
^ a = ^ a(a;b) =
^ b[a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)2]
2(1 + b)
^ b = ^ b(b) =
2~  1()
2(1 + b)
where ~ 2 = var[i + b(i   )j]
Proof. See Appendix.
5.2. Self-Attenuating Strategic Voting. Section 1 argued that, with private signals as the
dominant information source, strategic voting exhibits negative feedback. The best response
function ^ b(b) characterises an agent's response to her private signal. It's behaviour is described
in the following lemma.









Lemma 4 states that ^ b(b) is decreasing in b: An increase in the tendency by others to vote
strategically (b ") reduces the tendency for the rational agent i = 0 to vote strategically (^ b #).
Of course, the coecient b measures only the response of the strategic incentive to the private
signal. Turning to the intercept a, notice that:
^ a =





This consists of two terms. The rst is a general strategic incentive term, and the second is
the response to the public signal. Notice that both of these terms are decreasing in b. Fixing b,
however, the intercept term is increasing in a. It follows that any common strategic incentive
is self-reinforcing in the standard way.
What explains the presence of negative feedback? Intuition is aided by Figures 2 and 3. Begin
by setting a = b = 0 for all agents i  1, corresponding to straightforward voting. Conditional
on the common component, a randomly selected agent supports option 1 with probabilitySELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 13
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over 
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Figure 2. Self-Reinforcing Strategic Voting with Public Signals
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Agent's Posterior
over 
 = Pr[b + bi + i  0]
Figure 3. Self-Attenuating Strategic Voting with Private SignalsSELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 14
p = Pr[ + i  0]. The rational agent i = 0 computes the likelihood ratio of p =  versus
p = 1   . The critical values of the common component are 0 and  0 respectively, where
 = Pr[0 + i  0]. These critical values are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Now, increase a, so that a > b = 0. The critical values of the common component are now
0 a and  0 a. Comparing these two yields a larger likelihood ratio, and hence an increased
strategic incentive. This is the standard logic of positive feedback | see Figure 2.
Resetting a = 0, now increase b, so that b > a = 0. The critical value of the common component
for p =  is now b, where  = Pr[+bi+i  0]. Recalling that i is symmetrically distributed
around , it follows that the critical value for p = 1    is  b. Notice that:
 0 <  b < 0 < b < 0
Agent i = 0 computes the likelihood ratio for two common component values that are closer
together. This yields a likelihood ratio that is closer to one, and hence a reduced strategic
incentive. This eect is illustrated in Figure 3 | there is negative feedback.
This may at rst seem counter-intuitive. When b is high, agents respond strongly to their
signals. In particular, this increases the likelihood of a tactical vote. Importantly, it increases
the probability of a strategic vote in both directions. Agent i = 0 with signal 0 > 0 is concerned
that other agents may observe signals i < 0, yielding a pivotal outcome involving option 2.
For high 0, this event seems most unlikely | surely option 1 will almost certainly win? But
if option 1 will almost certainly win, then the vote of agent i = 0 has no eect. She can only
inuence the outcome when there is a tie. But if there is a tie, then her strong signal must have
overstated the true constituency-wide support of option 1. She must therefore envisage a much
lower true value for . It is then reasonable for the vote to consider true values the common
component satisfying  < 0.
6. Equilibrium
6.1. Full Coordination. Fully coordinated equilibria are always present in this model. To see
this, suppose that all agents cast their vote for for option 1, irrespective of the public signal,
their payos or the realisation of their private signals. It follows that x = n, and thus q2 = 0. It
is (weakly) optimal for agent i = 0 to retain the posited strategy prole. A symmetric argument
establishes an equilibrium in which all agents vote for option 2.
Proposition 2. There are two fully coordinated equilibria, where all vote for one option.
Such equilibria correspond to pivotal log likelihood ratios of  = 1.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 15
6.2. Partial Coordination. A partially coordinated equilibrium is also available. As argued
in Section 5, a restriction to monotonic belief rules yields a best response in the class of ane
belief rules. An equilibrium in this class then corresponds to a nite pair fa;bg such that
b = ^ b(b) and a = ^ a(;ab). The properties of the mapping ^ b(b) immediately yield a unique
xed point.
























Proof. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 5. See Appendix for derivation of the inequalities.
Any partially coordinated equilibrium must entail b = b. It remains to consider xed points
of ^ a. Notice that ^ a is ane in a, yielding a unique partially coordinated equilibrium.




Proof. Straightforward solution to a = ^ a(a;b).
Corollary 1. There is a unique equilibrium monotonic belief rule.
An equilibrium selection problem is posed. This is resolved in the next section.
6.3. Equilibrium Selection. Begin with the initial hypothesis that all agents vote straight-
forwardly for their preferred option. This is equivalent to employing an ane belief rule with
parameters a0 = b0 = 0. Agent i = 0, acting optimally in response to this strategy prole will
employ an ane belief rule with parameters a1 = ^ a(0;0) and b1 = ^ b(0). Of course, this agent
will anticipate a similar response by the population at large, and hence update once more to
obtain a belief rule of a2 = ^ a(a1;b1) and b2 = ^ b(b1). This thought experiment describes an
iterative best response process within the class of ane belief rules. Of course, a starting point
within the monotonic class will enter and remain ane within one step. Formally:
Denition 4. Dene the iterative best response process by bt = ^ b(bt 1), at = ^ a(at 1;bt 1).
Having dened this process, global stability may be used as an appropriate equilibrium selection
criterion. Begin with the mapping ^ b(b). This mapping and the associated process fbtg are not
contingent on at, and hence may be considered in isolation.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 16
Lemma 7. b is globally stable in the iterative best response dynamic: bt ! b as t ! 1.
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Figure 4. ^ b(b) and Convergence to Equilibrium
Whereas the formal proof of Lemma 7 is algebraically tedious, a diagrammatic illustration
proves useful. Figure 4 plots the best response function ^ b(b), illustrating the convergence to
the xed point. Notice the cyclic behaviour | this is a consequence of the negative feedback
inherent in strategic voting with private signals. Begin with b0 = 0. Taking the next step,
the rational agent recognises the strategic behaviour of others. This attenuates the response
to the private signal, with a consequent reduction in b. Of course, this behaviour leaves open
the possibility of a limit cycle in the iterative best response process. Lemma 7 ensures that the
cycle dampens down, eventually converging to the unique xed point b.
To select an equilibrium, turn to the mapping ^ a(a;b).








If this holds, then the partially coordinated equilibrium is uniquely stable, and attained as the
limit of the iterative best response process from any nite starting point.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 17
Proof. This follows from the ane nature of the mapping ^ a | see Lemma 4. The sucient
condition is obtained by employing the upper bound on b from Lemma 6.
Corollary 2. As 2 " 1, the partially coordinated equilibrium is uniquely stable, with a # 0.
It follows that the partially coordinated equilibrium is selected whenever the public information
source is suciently imprecise. Notice that the precision is judged relative to the precision of
the private signal.6 Hence if private signals are relatively more important than public signals, a
partially coordinated outcome emerges. As Corollary 2 conrms, with only private information,
the equilibrium is never fully coordinated. Which situation is likely to obtain? In a national
referendum or similarly nationally conducted election, there are typically many public informa-
tion sources. Moreover, region-specic eects are unimportant. It follows that public sources
are likely to be more important than private. At a district level, however, commonly observed
public signals are likely to be fewer. It follows that private signals are the primary source of
information. A partially coordinated conclusion emerges, with multi-candidate support.
6.4. Comparative Statics. Comparative statics are absent in the Cox-Palfrey model of plu-
rality voting. The prediction of complete strategic voting yields a prediction that is unresponsive
to parameter changes. This is not the case here. This section explores comparative statics for
the pure private information case, where 2 " 1 and a = 0. Part II of Myatt (1999) provides
an analysis of the pure public information case.
Recall from Section 3 that i provides an appropriate measure of the strategic incentive for a
voter. Without loss of generality, set  > 0 so that option 1 is preferred by the majority of the












where the microfoundation case of  = = has been imposed. It is immediate that this
incentive is increasing in qualied majority required (), as well as the precision of the private
signal (1=2). Care is required in varying  and 2, since this alters the true support for option
2. Denote the (expected) proportion of the population in favour of option 1 as p. Recall that
p = (=). It follows that  =  1(p). Next, recall from the private signal microfoundation
that 2 = 2=m, where m is the size an agent's private sample. The bounds become:
2
p








6In fact, the condition presented here is of the same form as that in Morris and Shin (1999). They consider
the coordination problem of bank runs, and nd that the ratio of the variance of a public signal and standard
deviation of a private signal determines the uniqueness of equilibrium.SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 18
Clearly, the strategic incentive is increasing in p. Hence an increase in the (expected) asymmetry
between the two options increases the incentive for supporters of the weaker option to shift their
vote. Furthermore, the idiosyncrasy of preferences () increases the strategic incentive.
It is worthwhile considering the decision-theoretic benchmark | the behaviour of a rational
agent in an electorate of straightforwardly-voting agents. To do this, evaluate the tactical
incentive at the parameter b1 = ^ b(0). From the denition of ^ b from Lemma 4:
b1 = ^ b(0) =
2 1()
2
Evaluation the tactical incentive:
E[i] = b1 = 2m 1() 1(p)
Notice the crucial role played by the precision of private information. In the decision-theoretic
case the tactical incentive increases with the precision m. By contrast, in the game-theoretic
case, it increases with the square root of the precision | a much slower rate. Importantly, this
reects the self-attenuating nature of strategic voting. In an informal way, adding sophistication
to agent's behaviour | moving from a decision-theoretic to a game-theoretic model | reduces
the incentive for, and hence amount of, strategic voting.
The comparative static analysis presented above considers the strategic incentive for voters.
Of course, the probability of observing a strategic vote is further aected by the idiosyncrasy
of individual agents. As idiosyncrasy increases (2 ") there are a greater number of extreme
agents, who require a larger incentive to switch their vote. This suggests that an increase in
idiosyncrasy will reduce the probability of a strategic vote. Note, however, that the strategic
incentive is increasing in . The two eects must be considered together.
To investigate this issue, adopt the microfoundation example for the private signal, so that i
is based on a private sample of m agents, including the agent herself. Furthermore, suppose
that in the case of the m   1 other agents, the signal is accurate so that
P
k6=i k = 0 | this
helps simplify the analysis. It follows that:







The agent votes for option 1 whenever:
(1 + b) +
b + m
m






By contrast, the agent actually prefers option 1 whenever i=   =. It follows that such an
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Figure 5. Strategic Voting Probabilities












Comparative statics on the probability of a strategic vote are thus obtained via an analysis of b.
This response b is actually decreasing in , and hence an increase in the idiosyncrasy of agents'
preferences will reduce the probability of a strategic vote.
7. Illustration




The parameter  is chosen so that approximately 2:5% of the population prefer option 2 twice
as much as option 1. Using these parameters, Figure 5 plots the probability of observing a
strategic vote against the precision of the information source. Both the game-theoretic case
(b = b) and the decision-theoretic case (b = ^ b(0)) are displayed.
8. Conclusion
This new theory of strategic voting observes that the Cox (1994) and Palfrey (1989) models of
strategic voting are driven by the assumption that voter preferences are drawn independently
from a commonly-known distribution. This leads to the divergence of the pivotal log-likelihood
ratios that are the critical determinants of optimal voting behaviour. Introducing uncertainSELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 20
common eects to voter preferences results in uncertain constituency-wide candidate support,
and overturns this result | pivotal log-likelihood ratios remain nite. Moreover, it is only
uncertainty over common eects that matters. This suggests that the Cox-Palfrey model is
perhaps driven by the wrong factors.
The introduction of uncertain common eects, and the modelling of voter information sources
leads to new insights. The key r^ ole of information is now clear | a fully coordinated outcome
requires both precise public information and the absence of precise private information. When
regional eects are important, and information is likely to be privately observed, the model
predicts some, but not complete, strategic voting.
Earlier models lack comparative static predictions. This is a necessary consequence of the
strictly coordinated prediction. Here, the comparative statics are clear. Importantly, in a
\close" election (corresponding to low  and p), there is less strategic voting. Perhaps most
importantly, strategic voting is self-attenuating, and increasing the sophistication of voters
reduces its eect.
Of course, the formal model here is one of qualied majority voting. Myatt (1999) employs a
variant of this model to address directly the issues arising in a plularity rule election. Weaknesses
in that model (as here) remain. Indeed, uncertainty of the qualied majority ( here) and multi-
directional strategic voting require further analysis.
All of these issues are the subject of ongoing research. In addition, empirical testing of the model
is already in progress, and experimental work is planned. Hopefully a greater understanding of
strategic behaviour may lead to a better understanding of electoral systems.
Appendix A. Omitted Proofs
A.1. Pivotal Properties. This section provides omitted proofs from Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1: Introduce the parameter ~  where 1





p~ (1   p)1 ~ n f(p)dp
R 1






p~ (1   p)1 ~ n f(p)dp
R 1
0 [p~ (1   p)1 ~ ]
n f(1   p)dp
where the second equality follows from a simple change of variables in the denominator. Re-
calling the denition of the pivotal probabilities q1 and q2, it follows that q1=q2 = r(n). Now
introduce the notation G(p):
G(p) 
p~ (1   p)1 ~ 




0 G(p)nf(1   p)dp
(4)
Notice that G(p) is increasing from G(0) = 0, attaining a maximum of G(~ ) = 1 at p = ~ , and












where the extrema are well dened since [x   ;x + ] is a compact set and f(p) is continuous
from Assumption 5. Employing this notation, formulate an upper bound for the ratio r(~ ) in
Equation (4):
(5) r(~ ) 
fH;(~ )
R ~ +
~   G(p)ndp + fH;2(~ )
hR ~  








F(~    2)G(~    2)n + (1   F(~  + 2))G(~  + 2)
fL;(1   ~ )
R ~ +
~   G(p)ndp









fL;(1   ~ )






G(p)ndp  G(~    )n













G(~    )
n
dp  ! 0
which holds since G(p) < G(~    ) for all p < ~    2. An identical argument ensures that the
third term vanishes. A similar argument applies to the fourth term:
F(~    2)
fL;(1   ~ )




F(~    2)
fL;(1   ~ )

G(~    2)
G(~    )
n
 ! 0




fL;(1   ~ )
Notice now that  may be chosen arbitrarily small. It follows that:
lim
n!1
r(~ )  lim
!0
fH;(~ )
fL;(1   ~ )
=
f(~ )
f(1   ~ )
A symmetric procedure bounds the limit below, and hence r(~ ) ! f(~ )=f(1   ~ ). Next,
construct a compact interval [    ; +  ] around , for small  . For ~  2 [    ; +  ], the
argument above establishes that r(~ ) ! f(~ )=f(1   ~ ) pointwise on this interval. But since
r(~ ) and its limit are continuous, and the interval is compact, it follows that this convergenceSELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 22
is uniform. Now, recall that n = dne=n, and hence n ! . It follows that n 2 [  ;+ ]
for suciently large n. For suciently large n, r(n) is arbitrarily close to f(n)=f(1   n).
But by taking   suciently small, it is assured that this is arbitrarily close to f()=f(1   ),
which follows from the continuity of f. This completes the proof.
A.2. Ane Belief Rules. This section provides omitted proofs from Sections 5 and 6.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider an arbitrary smoothly increasing belief rule (i). Dene:
p = Pr[(i) +  + i  0j] = H()
This is the probability that a randomly selected agent i supports option 1, given the common
utility component . Given that (i) is smoothly increasing, H() is strictly and smoothly
increasing in . Write h() = H0(). It follows that:






where  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal. This probability (via E() and
var[]) is conditional on the information available to the agent i = 0, and uses the fact that





































H 1(1   )2   H 1()2
2var[]
+
H 1()   H 1(1   )
var[]
E[]
Notice that this is ane in E[]. Now, voter i = 0 bases her beliefs on the privately observed








Thus var[] does not depend on 0, and E[] is ane in 0, so that ^ (0) is ane in 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose that each agent i  1 adopts the posited ane belief rule, so that
i = a + bi. Individual i votes for option 1 whenever:
 + a + bi + i  0 , a + (1 + b)   i   b(i   )SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 23
Conditional on , the right hand side is normally distributed with zero expectation, and variance
~ 2 = var[i + b(i   )]. It follows that:
p = H() = 

a + (1 + b)
~ 

)  = H 1(p) =
~  1(p)   a
1 + b
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal. Dierentiate to obtain:















Begin with the rst term of Equation (6). First employ the symmetry of the normal distribution








Next consider the second term of Equation (6).
H 1()2 =
(~  1()   a)2
(1 + b)2 =
[~  1()]2 + a2   2a~  1()
(1 + b)2
Similarly:
H 1(1   )2 =
[~  1(1   )]2 + a2   2a~  1(1   )
(1 + b)2 =
[~  1()]2 + a2 + 2a~  1()
(1 + b)2
It follows that:





The nal term is simply:
H 1()   H 1(1   )
var[]
E[] =








2~  1()(a + (1 + b)E[])
var[](1 + b)2
The next step is the evaluation of the expectation and variance of , conditional on the infor-
mation the focal agent i = 0. Once again, recalling Lemma 1 of Section 2 it follows that:
E[] =
2 + 20
2 + 2 and var[] =
22
2 + 2
Substitute in to obtain:




2~  1()(a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)(2 + 20))
22(1 + b)2
Separate this out to obtain the ane function:
^  =
2~  1()[a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)2]
22(1 + b)2 +
2~  1()0
2(1 + b)SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 24
Taking the intercept:
2~  1()[a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)2]
22(1 + b)2 =
2~  1()2
22(1 + b)
[a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)2]
2(1 + b)
=
^ b[a(2 + 2) + (1 + b)2]
2(1 + b)
This yields the desired result.




This requires evaluation of ~ , which satises:
~ 2 = var[i + b(i   )j] = 2 + b22 + 2b
















2 + b22 + 2b
 
p























This is decreasing for b  0 if:
b2 + 




Re-arrange this expression to obtain (   )  b(   ) To check this inequality, rst
consider the right hand side. First   = by assumption | see Section 2. Since b  0, it is
sucient to show that the left hand side is weakly negative, which requires   . But this
holds, since 0    1 and   . It follows that the function is (weakly) decreasing everywhere.








These calculations yield the desired properties of the function.




2 + b22 + 2b
 + bSELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 25









An upper bound may now be obtained by solving the equation:
2   2 1()( + ) = 0


















This upper bound was obtained by setting  = 1. A tighter bound is available via a formal
implementation of the microfoundation for the privately observed signal. In that case, the








2 + 2 + 2
2 + 2 + 2






To obtain an upper bound, solve the equation:
4   (2 1())2(2 + 2) = 0


























Moreover, it is clear that this bound is attained as  # 0.
Proof of Lemma 7: Consider the mapping:
B(b) = ^ b(2)(b) = ^ b(^ b(b))SELF-ATTENUATING STRATEGIC VOTING 26
Notice that ^ b is also a xed point of B. Taking the derivative of this function:
B0(b) = ^ b0(^ b(b))^ b0(b)
It follows that this is an increasing function, since ^ b0  0. Consider a generic xed point b,
satisfying B(b) = b. Evaluate the derivative at this xed point:
B0(b) = b
(
^ b2 + 















^ b22 + ^ b













It is clear that, for  > 0, both of these terms are less than one, and hence B0(b) < 1 at a
xed point. It follows that any xed point must be a downcrossing. Further xed points would
require an upcrossing, and hence there is a unique xed point b. From this it follows that
bt ! b. To see this, notice that bt+2 = B(bt). From the properties of B, there is the required
convergence.
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